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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF.UTAH 
FRANKLIN D. RICHARDS 
Plaintiff and Appellant 
Case No. 8970 
vs. 
ROBERT A. ANDERSON, 
Defendant and Respondent 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff commenced an action for damages to his auto-
mobile in the city court of Salt Lake City, Utah, where the 
court sitting without a jury, granted judgment for plaintiff. 
The defendant appealed to the District Court. At the pretrial 
conference defendant's motion for summary judgment on the 
basis of facts stipulated to by respective counsel was granted 
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on the ground that plaintiff was guilty of negligence as a 
matter of law. Plaintiff has appealed to this court from said 
judgment. 
The judgment ( R -5) contains respective counsels stipu-
lations of facts. In addition the plaintiff's affidavit with the 
officer's diagram and measurements of the accident and a 
report of accident prepared by and bearing the appellant's 
signature (Exhibit I) were admitted by stipulation and are 
part of the record supporting the judgment. 
Appellant has set forth the facts in his brief which 
respondent accepts with the following exceptions: At the 
pretrial conference it was stipulated that the respondent 
stopped at the stop sign and waited for several cars to go 
by ( R -5) . Two cars in the outside lanes then stopped to 
allow respondent to enter the intersection. (Exhibit I). Re· 
spondent then started up from his stopped position and 
proceeded in front of the two stopped cars in the center and 
out~ide lanes (Exhibit I) (R-5) but collided with appellant's 
car 5 feet in the inside lane of traffic after traveling into the 
intersection 38 feet. (Officer's diagram.) Respondent 
was traveling at a ~peed of 5-10 m.p.h. at impact and appellant 
1 ;). 20 m.p.h. Appellant failed to see respondent until he was 
a few feet from him. (R-7) 
The ~ole que~tion raised on this appeal is whether upon 
the~ faet~ it can be ~aid that appellant was guilty of negli-
g•·nct' as a matter of law. 
ST ATEl\1ENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
THERE \\'AS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE BEFORE 
THE COUHT FOR IT TO RULE AS A MATTER OF LAW 
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THAT PLAINTIFF WAS GUILTY OF NEGLIGENCE 
WHICH PROXIMATELY CONTRIBUTED TO THE ACCI-
DENT AND PLAINTIFF'S DAMAGE. 
(a) PLAINTIFF FAILED TO YIELD THE RIGHT-
OF-WAY TO DEFENDANT. 




THERE WAS SUFFICIENT. EVIDENCE BEFORE 
THE COURT FOR IT TO RULE AS A MATTER OF LAW 
THAT PLAINTIFF WAS GUILTY OF NEGLIGENCE 
WHICH PROXIMATELY CONTRIBUTED TO THE 
ACCIDENT AND PLAINTIFF'S DAMAGE. 
(a) PLAINTIFF FAILED TO YIELD THE RIGHT-OF-
WAY TO DEFENDANT. 
It is not disput~d that respondent stopped at the stop 
sign and waited for several cars to go by. In fact counsel for 
appellant contends that respondent waited at the stop sign 
so long he became impatient and started out in front of 
cars in the right lanes of traffic (Appellant Brief - Page 5). 
Appellant filed a Report of Accident and Claim with 
respondents insurance carrier, (Exhibit 1) for the damages 
to his automobile in which he set forth his own version of how 
the accident occurred. His statement contained therein is as 
follows: "Anderson started up from stop sign and ran in 
front of my car. Cars 1 and 2 stopped to let Anderson in 
lane, however, instead of him going in their lane he· pulled 
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in front of me." Appellant also included a diagram to show 
the stopped cars in the two right lanes. 
Section 41-6-74 U. c.· A. 1953 is involved and provides 
as follows: 
"Vehicle entering a through highway. The driver 
of a vehicle shall stop as required by this act at the 
entrance to a through highway and shall yield the 
right-of-way to other vehicles which have entered the 
intersection from said through highway or which are 
approaching so closely on said through highway as to 
constitute an immediate hazard, but said driver hav-
ing so yielded may proceed and the drivers of all 
other vehicles approaching the intersection on said 
through highway shall yield the right-of-way to the 
vehicle so proceeding into or across the through high-
way. 
(b) The driver of a vehicle shall likewise stop in 
obedience to a stop sign as required herein at 
an intersection where a stop sign is erected at 
one or more entrances thereto although not a part 
of a through highway and shall proceed cautious-
ly, yielding to vehicles not so obliged to stop 
which are within the intersection or approaching 
so closely as to constitute an immediate hazard, 
but may then proceed." 
The question arises as to when a vehicle constitutes an 
immediate hazard. In the case of Fusco vs. Dauphin et al, 
1950 Delaware 88 A. ( 2d) 813. The court had occasion to 
define the term. In that case the plaintiff, a passenger on a 
motorcycle, driving along a through highway, was struck 
by the truck of the defendant which stopped at the stop sign 
before entering the intersection. 
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The accident happened near the center of the intersec-
tion. There was no evidence as to the distance the plaintiff's 
motorcycle was away from the intersection when the truck 
started out, but the motorcycle was traveling 15-20' m.p.h. 
An immediate hazard statute, similar to the Utah statute, 
was involved, and the court, in construing the same, stated as 
follows: 
"What constitutes an immediate hazard neces-
sarily calls for a construction of Section .. 602 of the 
City Ordinances. In this connection, also, the true 
meaning of the word "yield" in the third line from 
the end of the ordinance must be considered. 
The driver approaching the stop sign must, of 
course, stop. He is in a position to observe on-com-
ing traffic and judge its speed and to determine the 
approximate distance and time it would take him to 
cross safely. At a proper moment when on-coming 
traffic does not create an "immediate hazard," he 
may proceed out into the intersection and force op-
posing traffic to "yield." Now, the word "yield" 
carries with it the connotation of giving way to the 
extent even of a complete stop. But so to construe the 
word in the light of the practical purposes sought to 
be accomplished by this ordinance would be complete-
ly unrealistic. Such a construction would ( l) con-
flict with a sensible interpretation of the words "im-
mediate hazard" because if the driver on the favored 
street must stop or slow down sharply. to. avoid col-
lision with the disfavored driver, the latter cons~itutes 
an "immediate hazard" from a common sense point 
of view."* * * 
"With these considerations in mind I conclude 
that a realistic construction of Section 602 compels 
this result: an "immediate hazard" is created when 
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a vehicle approaches an intersection on a favored 
street at a reasonable speed under such circumstances 
that, if the disfavored operator proceeds into the in-
tersection, it forces the former sharply and suddenly 
to check his progress or to come to a halt in order to 
avoid collision." 
In the case of Fisher vs. Wichita Transportation Com-
pany, 1943 156 Kan. 500, 134 Pac. (2d) 393, a large bus 
traveling at about 3 m.p.h. entered an intersection from the 
north, after a stop to discharge a passenger, and then com-
menced a left turn at about 3 m.p.h. At the time of the com-
mencement of the left turn, the jury found, on special 
interrogatories that the plaintiff was approaching the inter-
section from the south at a distance of 150 feet, traveling 
at 21 m.p.h. The plaintiff failed to take any steps to avoid 
the accident, although he could have stopped or turned out. 
The jury found specifically that the bus failed to yield the 
right-of-way, and that the plaintiff's vehicle was so close as to 
constitute an immediate hazard when the bus was in the inter-
sections intending to make a left turn. 
Judgment was entered on the general verdict and the 
defendant appealed. 
On appeal the appellate court held the plaintiff was not 
an immediate hazard and cited the case of Rouleau vs. 
Blotner 84 NH 539 152 A 916, and quoted the following 
from the Rouleau case: 
"The defendant's truck which had come from the 
north started to make a left turn at a street intersec-
tion. It was moving at five miles per hour. Plaintiff 
in his automobile was coming toward the intersection 
from the opposite direction. Plaintiff's car was 150 
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feet south when defendant's truck was. making the 
turn. A collision followed and plaintiff recovered 
damages, but the verdict was set aside on appeal and 
judgment directed for defendant. In the opinion it 
was said "the only other claim of fault is the general 
ground that it was careless to attempt to make the turn 
when and as the defendant's servant did. Traffic 
has the right to move in a reasonable way,· and a 
driver may rely upon the proposition that other driv-
ers will use due care unless there be something to 
inform him that such is not the fact." 
"The large truck was an object which could not 
escape the observation of an;y on-coming careful 
driver. The plaintiff's car was at least 150 feet dis-
tant when its driver would see the truck turning across 
his path if he looked. The intervening distance was 
sufficient several times over for him to stop. More-
over, he did not need to stop. If he had slowed 
down, he would have passed to the rear of the truck 
while still going at a moderate rate of speed for a 
thickly settled village street." 
"We agree with this decision of the New Hamp-
shire Court. It would not create an "immediate haz-
ard" for the driver of Defendants' bus to make a left 
turn when Plaintiff was coming from the approxi-
mate distance of 150 feet south of the intersection as 
the bus commenced to make its turn." 
The question is whether or not the appellant's vehicle 
constituted an immediate hazard to the respondent's vehicle 
within the meaning of the statute after the respondent's 
vehicle had come to a stop at the stop sign. (It has been 
stipulated that respondent entered the intersection first.) It 
is certain that appellant's vehicle did not constitute an im-
mediate hazard to respondent's vehicle when respondent 
first brought his vehicle to a stop at the entrance to the high-
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way, for respondent was at the stop sign while several cars pre-
ceding the appellant's car passed the intersection. 
. Having so yielded to cars then within the intersection, or 
approaching so closely as to constitute an immediate haz-
ard, . the respondent then had a right, under the statute to 
proceed and the drivers of all other vehicles approaching the 
intersection were required to yield the right-of-way to respon-
dent proceeding into the intersection. 
In this instance, two drivers, one in the center and one 
in outside .lane, stopped, either in compliance with their duty 
to yield the right of way to respondent, or voluntarily re-
linqU:ished any. right they may have had, and afforded the 
respondent an opportunity to enter and cross the intersection. 
The appellant however passed the two cars on his right, failed 
to yield the right of way, and further failed to heed the warn-
ing signal constituted by the two stopped or stopping cars on 
his right. 
In the stipulated facts set forth in the judgment it is 
stated as follows: ". . . that after first having made a stop 
and . waited, the defendant then proceeded into the intersec-
tion and that a car in the center lane for west-bound traffic 
caTTle to a stop for the defendant prior to the defendant's 
entry on to 5th South Street. (Underlining ours.) (R-5) 
The respondent entered the intersection from a stopped 
position and attained a maximum speed of 5-10 m.p.h. by the 
time he traveled· the 38 feet into the intersection to the point 
of i·mpact. Appellant acknowledges a speed of 15-20 m.p.h. 
at the time he entered the intersection and as he approached, 
and ' he would therefore be several times as far from the 
point of impact, which occurred 10 feet west of the east side 
of the intersection, as respondent when he entered the inter-
section. As respondent started out, the appellant had in the 
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lane immediately to his right a stopped car, waiting for 
respondent to travel in front of him. This car was almost 
as cle::r a signal of danger as would he the clear unobstructed 
view of respondent's vehicle moving across the intersection. 
At the distance which appellant had to he from the intersec-
tion when respondent started out, it is difficult to under-
stand how appellant failed to see respondent if appellant had 
kept a proper lookout. 
There can he little doubt hut that appellant could have 
brought his vehicle . to a complete stop with lots of room to 
spare after respondent entered the intersection and prior to 
his arrival at the point of impact, for at 15 m.p.h., even on 
damp asphalt, it would have taken only 15-17 feet for ap-
pellant to have brought his vehicle to a stop ·after observing 
danger and at 20 m.p.h. 24-28 feet. (Utah Highway Patrol 
Speed Calculator). The appellant's vehicle did not, there-
fore, constitute an immediate hazard to the vehicle of the 
respondent and the respondent's vehicle clearly had the 
right of way as between the two vehicles. Appellant's failure 
to yield the right of way constituted negligence as a matter of 
law. 
(h) PLAINTIFF FAILED TO KEEP A PROPER 
LOOKOUT 
Respondent traveled a distance of 38 feet into the inter-
section hut appellant did not see his car until appellant was 
a few feet from point of impa-ct. Appellant claims there 
were cars in the right and center lanes to the right of ap-
pellant which possibly prevented appellant from seeing 
respondent's car. Occupying part of that 38 feet were two 
vehicles which stopped. for respondent. Each vehicle would. 
occupy about 6 feet of space, of that .38 feet, or a total of 
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12 feet, leaving a possible 26 feet of unoccupied space across 
which respondent traveled when part of his car would be vis-
ible to appellant. The closer appellant got to the point of im-
pact the more difficult it would be for him to see between the 
two cars, but until he got very close to them he should have 
had little difficulty in seeing the respondent's car traversing 
the highway in front of him. He was also put on notice of the 
approach of the respondent's car by the very fact that the two 
cars came to a stop in front of him. He had much more op-
portunity than either of the two cars on his rightto bring his 
vehicle to a stop before colliding with respondent's vehicle. 
It is difficult to believe that the appellant, if he had 
been keeping a proper lookout, could have completely failed 
to see the respondent's vehicle traveling across the intersec-
tion and the fact that vehicles in the right lanes were stopped 
or stopping in front of him, if he observed them, should 
have been a red light signal to him and caused him to pro-
ceed with caution past the car so stopped. Even though he 
may have been going only 15 miles per hour, as he claims, 
if he could not stop within his range of vision, he was trav-
eling too fast for the conditions. When one considers that 
the one car at least, in the center lane, was stopped in front 
of him as the respondent traveled out from the stop sign and 
that the stopped car was directly in appellant's line of vision, 
it becomes difficult to envision that appellant could have been 
keeping any lookout at all or paying attention to his driving. 
He had several seconds within which to observe and react to 
the situation in front of him. 
In Conklin v. Walsh, 113 Utah 276, 193 P. (2d) 437, 
this court held a driver on an arterial highway guilty of 
negligence as a matter of law in failing to re-ohserve the 
plaintiff£ vehicle after it had stopped at a stop sign and pro-
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ceeded into the intersection, the defendant being at the time 
of his first observation about 1;4 block away ( approx. 165 
feet) traveling 30-45 miles per hour. This Court stated: 
"Neither driver can excuse his own failure to 
observe because the other driver failed in his duty. 
Neither driver is at any time to be excused for want 
of vigilance or failure to see what is Jl!ain to be 
seen. Drivers are permitted to cross over arterial 
highways after having stopped. True, they must 
yield the right of way to cars which are close enough 
to constitute an immediate hazard. This rule, however, 
requires the exercise of some judgment. There is still a 
duty on the part of the driver traveling the arterial 
highway to remain reasonably alert to the possibility 
of the disfavored driver starting across the intersec-
tion in the belief that he can cross in safety. The 
duty of keeping a proper lookout attends all those 
operating motor vehicles and other rules of the road 
do not relieve any driver of the necessity of comply-
ing with this requirement." 
In Mingus v. Olsson, 114 Utah. 505, 201 P. (2d) 495, 
this Court held a pedestrian to be guilty of contributory 
negligence as a matter of law in failing to keep a proper 
lookout, notwithstanding the fact that he was in a crosswalk 
and had the right of way over defendant's vehicle, saying: 
"A pedestrian crossing a public street in a cross-
walk or pedestrian lane, although he may have the 
right of way over vehicular traffic, nonetheless has 
the duty to observe for such traffic. Clearly, dece-
dent neglected the duty in this case. It follows that he 
was contributorily negligent as a matter of law. Of 
course we do not mean to imply that a mere glance 
in the direction of the approaching automobile would 
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suffice. The duty to look has inherent in it the duty 
to see what is there to be seen, and to pay heed to it." 
(Underlining ours) 
As has been previously stated, this accident took place 
at a T intersection. There was no place but forward and 
to the right, from which direction respondent's vehicle was 
approaching, to demand appellant's attention. His failure 
to see what was there to he seen and to pay heed to it 
constituted negligence as a matter of law. 
CONCLUSION 
There was clearly sufficient evidence before the trial 
court for it to rule that appellant was guilty of negligence 
which proximately caused or contributed to the accident as 
a matter of law. Furthermore, the evidence conclusively 
and as a matter of law showed that appellant was guilty of 
contributory negligence. The lower court, therefore, prop-
erly granted the respondent's motion for summary judgment 
and the judgment should he affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RICH & STRONG and 
LAWRENCE L. SUMMERHAYS, 
Attorneys for Defendant 
and Respondent. 
604 Boston Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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